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I. INTRODUCTION
The refrain has become common that in this world the only things
certain are death and taxes.' Of almost equal certainty in our society
is the existence of numerous occupational groups ready to assist us in
dealing with these and other less inevitable eventualities. A variety of
professionals offer to ease the burden of coping with that one inevitable,
taxes. By contrast, modern history has produced only two occupations-
funeral directors and embalmers-whose members come forward on the
occasion of that other inevitable, death, and offer to perform the
variety of tasks associated with the prompt, sanitary, and dignified
disposition of the dead.
That these two occupations are assumed to be the sole providers
of an essential, quasi-public service is reflected in state occupational
0 Member, Wisconsin Bar. Associate, Tuchscherer Law Offices, Wausau, Wisconsin.
B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1977.
The author is grateful to Professor Gerald Thain of the University of Wisconsin Law
School faculty for his generous supervision of this research and helpful critique of the
manuscript.
1. "Our Constitution is in actual operation; everything appears to promise that it
will last; but in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes." Letter from Benjamin
Franklin to M. Leroy (1789), quoted in J. BARTLE'Ir, FAMILIAR f1UOTATIONS 423a (14th
ed. 1968).
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licensing laws. Such statutes generally require that no one engage in
removing and preparing dead human bodies for burial or other dis-
position for compensation unless he or she is licensed as a funeral
director or embalmer.2
There are indications, however, that these assumptions about who
will and who should perform post-death activities may no longer be
valid. Within the last two decades American attitudes toward funerary
practices have changed.3 The most noteworthy of these changes is the
gradual, yet appreciable, increase in the number of cremations per-
formed in lieu of the more traditional earth burial 4 and the number
'performed without accompanying funeral or religious services. 5
An adjunct to these changes has been the appearance, beginning in
1971 in California and in 1973 in Florida, of business operations run
by individuals not licensed as funeral directors that offer to perform
simple disposition of dead human bodies without embalming and
2. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7617, 7641 (West 1975); Wis. STAT, §§ 156.04,
156.05 (1974).
In common parlance the terms funeral director and embalmer are used inter-
changeably. There is, however, a difference in definition, particularly with respect to
licensing. A funeral director generally serves the public in all aspects of funeral service
-except embalming. When a death occurs, the funeral director's services include: removing
the deceased to a funeral home; completing and filing a death certificate; obtaining
a burial or transportation permit; preparing newspaper funeral notices; arranging for
a clergyman or other person to officiate at the funeral; contacting casket bearers;
arranging for the selection of cemetery space or the opening of a grave in a family
plot; or if final disposition is to be cremation, securing permits and making arrange-
-ments with the crematory; at times serving as a counselor to the family; arranging
and assisting in the conduct of the funeral service; and providing for the transportation
of the body to the place of final disposition. After the service, the funeral director
assists the family in filing necessary claims for Social Security, veterans' and union
benefits, and insurance. In addition to these services, the funeral director provides
certain goods, such as burial clothing, a casket, registration books, and memorial
cards.
An embalmer, on the other hand, is licensed to prepare the body of the deceased
-for a funeral and burial. He does so by first washing and cleansing the entire body,
'giving particular attention to the hands, face and hair. The actual embalming process
involves making an incision in the vascular system of the body and injecting preserving
chemicals, under controlled pressure, through an artery. The body fluids are then
removed through a vein. During this process the arms and facial features are set in the
.positions they will retain when the embalming process is completed. The embalmer
.next performs necessary restorative work, using special wax and other materials. The
body is then dressed and cosmetics are applied to the hands and face.
3. See R. FULTON, A COMPILATION OF STUDIES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH, FUNERALS
AND FUNERAL DIRECToRS (1971).
.. 4. In .1971 there were.92,251 cremations in the United States. The largest number
of these took place on the West Coast, in Florida, and in large metropolitan areas.
"IRION," To Cremate or Not, -in CONCERNING DEATH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE LIVING
239, 245 (E. Grollman ed. 1974).
• .5. National Funeral Directors Association, Death Notice Study, 1958-1975 (Milwaukee,
Wis., Dec. 31, 1975).
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without funeral or religious services." Essentially these businesses offer
to remove or arrange for the removal of the body from the place of
death, keep it in a refrigeration facility until a death certificate is filed
and a cremation permit is obtained (usually a matter of days), cremate
or arrange for the cremation of the body, and dispose of the cremated
remains according to the family's instructions.
Not long after these simple disposition, or, as they prefer to be
called, direct cremation businesses emerged, their existence was
challenged by the state licensing authorities responsible for regulating
activities involving the disposition of the dead. Those offering direct
cremation services objected to any regulatory attempts by a "State Board
of Funeral Directors and Embalmers," on the basis that their activities
included neither the directing of funerals nor the embalming of bodies.
In other words, they maintained that they represented a new occupa-
tional activity: one peripheral to what has been traditionally conceived
of as the funeral directing occupation, but not encompassed by it. The
state boards responded that, although the direct cremation businesses
were not actually conducting funerals or embalming bodies, they were
still performing a number of related functions for which the law
requires a license. The boards maintained that all functions related
to the care and preparation of dead human bodies for disposition, by
any means, have been declared by their legislatures to be within the
sole purview of the licensed funeral service profession.
The conflicts which have surfaced in California and Florida illustrate
several aspects of a critical problem which is certain to confront other
states in their regulation of funerary and disposition practices.7 The
problem can be stated in the form of a thematic question: To what
extent can and should states regulate the activities of nonlicensed in-
dividuals who seek to perform basic functions of a licensed occupation
which, when taken alone, do not constitute the generally accepted
practice of that occupation? A brief overview of occupational licensing
in general will provide a context within which to conduct the analysis
of this question, and place the answer.
II. A PERSPECTIVE ON OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
Laws regulating the activities of many professions and occupations
whose members provide services to the public exist in each of the
United States. These laws are commonly referred to as licensing laws
since their primary regulatory force lies in the requirement that to
engage lawfully in the activity, one must satisfy a series of prescribed
6. See Section IV infra.
7. See note 194 infra.
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criteria and obtain a license." Before engaging in an examination of
the particular licensing laws that regulate occupations involved with
the disposition of dead human bodies, it would be helpful to gain a
perspective on occupational licensing in general by taking a brief
look at its origins and growth in the United States, the contents of a
typical licensing statute, the purposes and effects of licensing, and
significant challenges that have been made to particular licensing
systems.
At one time, with a few exceptions, only the professions of medicine
and law were licensed.9 In the latter half of the nineteenth century,
other occupational groups organized professional societies and associa-
tions, and they too demanded licensing regulation in the hope of
sharing in the status awarded to the "learned professions.' 0 These
efforts began to bear fruit around the turn of the century, and from
1906 to 1935 a veritable deluge of licensing legislation was enacted
nationwide. Today, there are more than 100 separate occupations
licensed in the United States.1
States enact licensing laws by authority of their police power. This
power, derived by each state from its constitution and from the United
States Constitution, is founded on the inherent right of a government
to protect its citizens and provide for the good order of society, within
constitutional limits.1 2 These limits have been interpreted by the courts
as being subject to the general qualifications that a regulation is valid
if it is reasonable, and can be justified as being essential to the public
health, safety, and general welfare. 13 It would appear that the word
"essential" has been given expanded meaning by state legislators who
have seen fit to extend the range of licensing regulation (or recognition)
8. M. CARROW, BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1, 66 (1948).
9. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE
STATES 21 (1952) . For an historical account of licensing in the medical profession, see R.
SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA (1967); Rayack, Restrictive Practices of Organized
Medicine, 13 ANTrrRusT BULL. 659 (1968). For an historical account of licensing in the
legal profession, see Comment, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay
Associations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (1966); Comment, Legal Paraprofessionals and Un-
authorized Practice, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 104 (1973); Comment, Controlling Lawyers
by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1970).
10. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN
THE STATES 20-22 (1952).
11. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING BY
THE STATES, PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 2-8 (1968).
12. E.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Martin, 24 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Ky. 1938), aff'd sub nom. Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); McKay Jewelers v. Bowron, 122 P.2d 543 (Cal. 1942);
Sowma v. Parker, 22 A.2d 513 (Vt. 1941).
13. Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186 (D.R.I. 1950), afJ'd, 190 F.2d
760 (Ist Cir., cert. denied, 342 U.S, 894 (1951); x parte Rameriz, 226 P. 914 (Cal.
1924).
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from occupations for which the need to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare seems readily apparent, such as doctors, dentists,
nurses, and optometrists, to those for which the need is not so apparent,
such as ordinary trades.1 4
Most licensing laws are modeled after the acts regulating the medical
and legal professions, and hence are similar in content. Typically,
each statute establishes a governmental licensing agency, describes the
composition of its board and the means of selecting its members, and
specifies the status of the agency (whether it is an independent board
or part of a department of state government) and its jurisdiction.'"
The law also specifies the minimum personal qualifications (age, resi-
dence, citizenship, character) and educational qualifications (course re-
quirements, completion of an approved program, experience, examina-
tions, etc.) for entrance into the occupation. 6 A definition of "practice"
sets forth the authorized scope of functions for the occupation. 17 Also
specified are conditions for the renewal of a license, guidelines and
procedures for suspension, revocation and reinstatement of a license,
and provisions for recognition of licenses from other states.' Licensing
gives a person legal authority to engage in a specified occupation;
without such authority the person could be fined or imprisoned.10
State legislatures have enacted licensing statutes to provide certain
benefits to the consuming public. One such benefit is the assurance
that only those who have demonstrated a certain level of competence
can enter an occupation. Additional benefits include maintenance of a
high quality of service and protection of consumers from fraud and
dishonesty. Further, individuals who believe themselves wronged by
14. In its report on occupational licensing in the United States cited in note 11,
the Council of State Governments listed twelve licensed occupations pertaining to the
fields of health and medicine. The twelve are part of a core of twenty-two occupations
which nearly all states license, the remainder being licensed by far fewer states.
Minnesota, for example, licenses boxing promoters, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 341.13 (West
1977 Supp.); and fur farmers, id. § 17.35. Swine dealers are licensed in Iowa, IowA CODE
ANN. § 163.30 (West 1977 Supp.); as are tattoo artists in Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §
321-14 (1975 Supp.); lightning rod salesmen in New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 323 (1968); sprinkler and irrigation fitters in Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-32 (1953);
hunting guides in Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 23-55 (1947); and hypertrichologists (re-
movers of excess facial hair) in Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-270 (West 1977
Supp.).
15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 470.02, .04 (1975). Chapter 470, Florida Statutes, the
funeral directors and embalmers law, is one of Florida's many licensing statutes re-
pealed-at least potentially-by the so-called "Sunset law." Regulatory Reform Act of
1976, ch. 76-168, 1976 Fla. Laws 295. See text accompanying notes 188-193 infra for a
discussion of this act.
16. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 470.08 (975).
17. See, e.g., id. § 470.01(2H4).
18. See, e.g., id. §§ 470.10, .12, .13, and .35.
19. See, e.g., id. § 470.21.
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a licensee's poor service or sharp dealings may be able to gain redress
more simply and inexpensively through the administrative procedures
of a state regulatory agency or licensing board, than by resort to the
judicial system.
The expressed purpose of a licensing system is to protect the public
interest, specifically the public health, safety, and general welfare. Yet
licensing legislation is seldom the result of public demand. More often
it results from the efforts of an occupational group seeking the benefits
of sanctioned restraints on competition. Typically, members of an occu-
pation organize into an association and participate in the drafting of a
licensing law that is introduced in the state legislature. They argue
that public harm will result if the occupation is not regulated. Critics
of licensing legislation suggest that self-interest, not public interest,
motivates such moves. 20
State licensing boards, or the administrative bodies established by
licensing statutes to oversee the regulatory process, are typically
controlled by members of the occupation.21 In effect, licensing is sanc-
tioned self-regulation. This practice is justified by assertions that only
experienced practitioners with demonstrated knowledge and ability
can adequately judge the abilities of their colleagues and establish
appropriate performance standards. Yet licensing boards can become
very effective tools for dealing with price cutters or other practitioners
whose conduct is deemed unfair or unethical by members of the occu-
pation but not necessarily by the general public. 22 Board members
usually have wide latitude in interpreting eligibility requirements for
admission to practice, setting fee schedules and recommending prices,
preparing exams, and engaging in other activities that may serve to
exclude would-be practitioners..2
One author describes the reasoning behind many board decisions
as "what is good for our profession is good for the community,' ' 24 a
position which disregards the implications these decisions may have
for other participants in the free-market system. One group of partici-
20. For excellent scholarly treatment of occupational licensing systems, see M.
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENTAL REsTRAINTs (1956); and J. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTs
(1970).
21. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7602 (West 1975) (board members, except
for three public members, are required to be licensed funeral directors or embalmers
with five years of professional experience); FLA. STAT. § 470.02(1) (1975) (board members
must be practicing and licensed funeral directors and embalmers with five years ex-
perience).
22. D. Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 46, 49 (1972).
23. B. SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 1 (1973).
24. Id.
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pants (or would-be participants excluded by certain licensing laws)
includes members of peripheral occupations who hold themselves out
as willing and able to do part of what a licensed profession does. Mem-
bers of peripheral occupations may argue that they do not come within
the same licensing requirements, or at least not to the same extent.
Since the first licensing statute there has been tension, and frequently
confrontation, between licensed members of an occupation and those
non-licensed persons providing related services.
For the most part, when challenges have been made by peripheral
service providers, the response has been that the licensed occupation is
already providing that service and more, and is well regulated to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare from incompetent practitioners.
The following analysis of such a challenge to the licensing laws for
funeral directors and embalmers will examine whether that response
will or should continue to be sufficient.
III. CURRENT LAWS REGULATING OCCUPATIONS
INVOLVED WITH THE DISPOSITION
OF DEAD HUMAN BODIES
State laws regulating occupations involved with the disposition
of the dead apply to what are commonly understood as the occupations
of funeral directing and embalming. Chapters of state statutes dealing
with the regulation of the disposition of human remains are generally
captioned as "Funeral Directors &c Embalmers," "Embalmers," "Funeral
Directing," or, in the case of Delaware, "Funeral Services and Con-
tracts."
25
Most of these statutes define the occupational activity they regulate,
but the definitions are not always clear as to what precise activities
constitute practice of the licensed occupation. For example, in Idaho,
the legislative expression is quite clear: "[E]very person . . .who shall
engage in the profession or business of conducting funerals and super-
vising or directing the burial and disposal of dead human bodies, or
performing any act or service connected therewith.., shall be deemed
a funeral director." 26 To clarify any lingering doubt, the licensing law
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business,
or any part of the business of making final disposition of dead human
bodies without first obtaining . . . a license therefor as herein pro-
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 24, ch. 31 (1975) ("Funeral Services and Contracts");
FLA. STAT. ch. 470 (1975) ("Funeral Directors & Embalmers"); GA. CODE ANN. ch. 84-8
(1975) ("Funeral Directors & Embalmers"); IDAHO CODE tit. 54, ch. 11 (1957) ("Em-
balmers"); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw art. 34 (McKinney 1971) ("Funeral Directing').
26. IDAHO CODE § 54-1101(B) (1957).
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vided. " 27 The Kentucky statute, by contrast, is not so clear, requiring
only that anyone who engages in, or attempts to engage in "funeral
directing" must be licensed under the provisions of the statute.2 8 The
practice of funeral directing, however, is not defined.
An additional problem lies in the scope of these definitions, which
varies considerably among the states. In Indiana, for example, the term
"funeral directing" is defined as "the profession of conducting and
directing or supervising funerals," and includes "all of such matters
under any other title customarily used therefor."29 In New York, the
term means much more, including "the care and disposal of the body
of a deceased person and/or the preserving, disinfecting and preparing
by embalming or otherwise, the body of a deceased person for funeral
services, transportation, burial or cremation."30 Despite these variations
and the occasional vagueness of some statutes, it seems apparent that
they express a common, general intent of state legislatures: that only
persons licensed as either funeral directors or embalmers may engage
lawfully, for compensation, in any activity involving the disposition,
by any means, of dead human bodies."'
When attack has been made upon these licensing laws, they have
been sustained as a proper exercise of a state's police power to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare.3 2 The New York Court of
Appeals' statement in People v. Ringe is representative:
The care of dead human bodies, and the disposition of them by
burial or otherwise, is so closely related to the health and general
welfare of a community that the business of caring for and disposing
of such bodies may be regulated by license and special regulation
under the general police power of the state.3 3
27. Id. § 54-1101.
28. Ky. R v. STAT. § 316.020 (1972).
29. IND. CODE ANN. § 63-720(d) (Burns 1974).
30. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 3400(d) (McKinney 1971).
31. Many states provide for exceptions to these licensing laws for individuals such
as state officers, hospital staff, ambulance personnel performing their duties, medical
school and anatomical association personnel, and individuals performing religious
ceremonies. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7616(b) (West 1975); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 156.16 (West 1974).
32. See, e.g., Keller v. State, 90 A. 603 (Md. 1914); People v. Ringe, 90 N.E. 451 (N.Y.
1910); F.E. Nugent Funeral Home, Inc. v. Beamish, 173 A. 177 (Pa. 1934); and Prata
Undertaking Co. v. State Bd. of Embalming & Funeral Directing, 182 A. 808 (R.I. 1936).
There have been successful attacks on the reasonableness of specific provisions of certain
states' licensing laws, but the basic concept of licensing funerary operations has been
held to be reasonable. For specific discussions of the validity of licensing laws for em-
balmers, see McKinley v. Reilly, 393 P.2d 268 (Ariz. 1964), and Louisiana State Board
of Embalmers v. Britton, 154 So. 2d 389 (La. 1963).
33. 90 N.E. at 453.
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One effect of the existing law is that a person seeking a license to
engage in the general business of providing for the disposition of human
remains must undergo instruction and training to provide traditional
American funeral services. Licensees are usually required to complete
at least one academic year in a professional curriculum in an accredited
college of funeral service education or mortuary science . 4 The pro-
fessional curriculum is generally comprised of coursework in anatomy,
physiology, chemistry, bacteriology, embalming, cosmetology, and the
techniques of funeral directing and funeral business management 5 Also
included is instruction in the detection of contagious diseases and laws
applicable to the transportation of dead bodies.36
After satisfactory completion of the prescribed coursework, a
prospective licensee must pass a state licensing examination, prepared
and administered in most states by a board composed either entirely
or primarily of licensed funeral directors . 3  A final requirement for
licensure is a period of internship or apprenticeship with a licensed
funeral director, ranging from one to three years in length.3 8
The majority of state licensing laws also impose requirements con-
cerning the physical facilities maintained by a funeral business. These
requirements are imposed to ensure proper embalming services.3 9 For
example, the Michigan statute provides that a "funeral establishment
must contain a preparation room equipped with tile, cement or
composition floor, necessary drainage and ventilation, and containing
necessary instruments and supplies for the preparation and embalming
of dead human bodies for burial, transportation or other disposition. '"40
34. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7643(e) (West 1975). This requirement was
upheld in Beard v. State Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 295 P. 1052 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1931). Florida requires, inter alia, that an applicant for licensure com-
plete the "required course in mortuary science in a school approved by the board."
FLA. STAT. § 470.08(l)(e) (1975).
35. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 470.08(l)(e) (1975).
36. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7622 (West 1975).
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 470.02, .09 (1975). The validity of legislation requiring
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in funeral directing or embalming has
been upheld in State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers v. Cooksey, 3 So. 2d 502
(Fla.), modified on other grounds and rehearing denied, 3 So. 2d 502, 508, adhered to on
rehearing, 4 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1941); in People v. Harrison, 156 N.Y.S. 679 (N.Y. App. Div.
1915); and in Commonwealth v. Markham, 174 A. 6 (Pa. 1934).
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 470.08(l)(e) (three years internship required); and Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 156.045(f) (West 1973) (one year apprenticeship required). There is some con-
flict indicated by the cases on the constitutionality of the extensiveness of some state's
apprenticeship requirements, but the concept itself has been upheld in, e.g., Vaughn v.
State Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 82 S.E.2d 618 (Va. 1954); and in State Bd.
of Funeral Directors & Embalmers v. Cooksey, 3 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1941).
39. A similar conclusion is stated in A. STREET, MORTUARY JuRISPRUDENCE 18 (1948)
[hereinafter STREET].
40. MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.869 (1976).
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The language in the Texas statute is somewhat more explicit, requir-
ing "[a] preparation room that is secluded from the public, properly
ventilated, and containing an operating table, sewer facilities, hot and
cold running water, and sufficient instruments and chemicals to
embalm a dead human body." 41 A number of states also require that
a funeral establishment contain a casket display room, a funeral
chapel, and a hearse or funeral coach.
42
The responsibility for regulating activities involving the disposition
of dead bodies is usually given to a state board empowered to promul-
gate rules and regulations under state licensing statutes.4 3 As stated pre-
viously, the membership of these boards is comprised entirely or
primarily of licensed funeral directors and embalmers. In a 1936
opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the practice of limit-
ing board membership to funeral directors and embalmers.4 4 In express-
ing the standard justification for such peer control, the court said it
was reasonable and proper for the board to be composed entirely of
funeral service practitioners because of the highly specialized nature
of the business.4 5 Notwithstanding the court's statement, there is little
question that, as the designated agencies for the control of individuals
involved with the disposition of the dead, the state boards have
exercised some influence in the restriction of competition for the
market.' 6
The primary public policy purposes of funeral director and em-
balmer licensing laws are to safeguard the public health and to protect
the public from commercial exploitation and deception by incompetent
and unscrupulous practitioners.4 7 Indeed, in seeking professional
licensure, funeral director trade associations advocated the inclusion
of codes of ethical practice in state licensing statutes to assure their
clientele of the "high personal character and the good moral standards
of their members." 8 A secondary, but important, policy purpose behind
funeral director and embalmer licensing laws is to limit the handling
of dead bodies to those who may be depended upon to discover life in
a supposedly dead body, and to detect and disclose to the proper police
41. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 4582b, § 4(c)(5) (Vernon 1976).
42. R. HABENSTEIN & W. LAMERS, THE HIsrORY OF AMERICAN FUNERAL DIRECTING 555
(1972) [hereinafter HABENSTEIN & LAMERS].
43. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7606 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. § 470.04 (1975).
44. Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Bd. of Embalming & Funeral Directing, 182 A.
808 (R.I. 1936).
45. Id. at 813.
46. HABENSTEIN & LAMEPS, supra note 42, at 554.
47. See cases cited in note 32 supra and accompanying text.
48. HABENSTEIN & LAMEaS, supra note 42, at 447..
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authorities physical indications that a person's death may have been
criminally caused. 49
Additional practical goals exist here as in all occupational licensing
systems. One purpose behind funeral directors' and embalmers' ad-
vocating licensure initially was to achieve the status and recognition
accorded other "professionals." 50 In their book on the history of
American funeral directing, Robert Habenstein and William Lamars
made the following observation:
The burden of this legislation goes beyond the stipulation of re-
quirements for licensure; a somewhat ill-formed, but nevertheless
recognizable image of the practitioner and the service he performs
orients this legislation: the image of the funeral home, serving the
community, "home operated" by a small number of skilled practi-
tioners who dedicate all their vocational efforts to this task on a
full time basis.51
The same authors conclude that "[1]icensing legislation ... has had the
effect of setting up standards of competence and performance, as
necessary to the public health and welfare of the community as to the
funeral directing profession itself. ' ' 52
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE STATUS QUO
A. The Challenge in California
In early 1971, California State Senator James R. Mills of San Diego'
requested a legal opinion from the state attorney general as to whether
an entity which was not licensed as a funeral director could,---for a.
reasonable charge, arrange for the cremation of a deceased human body
and the disposal of the ashes at sea. Senator Mills specified that the
entity would not take part in preparation of the remains for disposition
nor maintain a funeral establishment; and that its activities would be
limited to removing the body. from the place of death, :obtaining
necessary disposition permits, causing cremation of the body, and
distributing the cremains at .sea.'In his responding opinion, the At-
torney General stated that the hypothetical entity proposed by the
Senator would not require a funeral director's license because its activi-
ties would include only one of three tasks specified in the California
statutes as constituting the practice of funeral directing.
53
49. STREr, supra note 39, at 11.
- 150. HABENSTEIN & LAME S, supra note 42, at 448-49.
51. Id. at 554.
52. Id.
53. Informal letter opinion of the California Attorney General to Senator. James' R.
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The Attorney General's opinion was welcome news to three of
Senator Mills' constituents who for almost a year had been planning
the operation of a business identical to the "hypothetical entity" the
Senator described. Relying on the Attorney General's opinion, the
three (a bio-chemist, an attorney, and an advertising executive), none
of whom was licensed as a funeral director, founded the Telophase
Society-the first direct cremation business in the United States.
5 4
Soon after the Telophase Society had begun operating, the State
Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, an agency of the California
Department of Consumer Affairs, received numerous complaints from
funeral directors in San Diego County that Telophase was operating
without a license from the Board.55 These complaints and the Attorney
General's opinion mentioned above prompted several meetings between
officials of the State Board and representatives of the California Funeral
Directors Association, a trade association of practicing funeral directors
and embalmers, to discuss the issue of Telophase's nonlicensure. The
primary concern of both groups was that according to the Attorney
General's opinion, one could be engaged in disposing of dead human
bodies and not be subject to the laws which were designed to regulate
such activities.5 6 As a result of these meetings, the Board and the
Association decided that because the Attorney General's opinion had
been based on an interpretation of an existing statute as it applied to
the ongoing activities of Telophase, the proper course of action would
be to seek a legislative remedy by requiring operations such as Telo-
phase to obtain a license and thereby fall under the jurisdiction of the
Board.
5 7
Mills (Mar. 5, 1971). The statutory language interpreted by the Attorney General
provided:
A funeral director is a person, partnership, association, corporation or other
organization engaged in or conducting, or holding himself or itself out as engaged
in each of the following:
(a) Preparing for the burial or disposal, and directing and supervising for
burial or disposal of dead human bodies.
(b) Maintaining a funeral establishment for the preparation for the disposition
or for the care of dead human bodies.
(c) Using, in connection with his or its name or funeral establishment, the
words "funeral director," or "undertaker," or "mortician," or any other
title implying that he or it is engaged as a funeral director.
Act of Sept. 19, 1939, ch. 39, § 1, 1939 Cal. Stats. 412 (amended 1974) (emphasis supplied
by Attorney General).
54. Letter from Tom Sherrard, attorney for the Telophase Society, to the author
(Aug. 7, 1975). Telophase was named for the final state in mitosis--the division of living
cells.
55. Telephone interview with David T. Buck, Executive Secretary, California Bd.
of Funeral Directors & Embalmers (Aug. 5, 1975).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Officials of the Board then drafted, in consultation with representa-
tives of the Association, a bill that was introduced in the California
Senate in March, 1972. The bill sought to change the statutory defini-
tion of "funeral director" to include any person or organization "en-
gaged in or holding himself or itself out as engaged in the preparing for
the burial or disposal, or directing or supervising the burial or disposal
of dead human bodies."sa The bill further provided that no person
would be permitted to act as a funeral director or use in connection
with his name or business any title implying that he was engaged as a
funeral director unless he had obtained a funeral director license from
the Board.59 Finally, it required every funeral director to maintain a
"funeral establishment,"60 a term which was defined in the existing
statutes as including "a chapel in which funeral or other religious
services may be conducted," and a "preparation room equipped with
a sanitary flooring and necessary drainage and ventilation and contain-
ing necessary instruments and supplies for the preparation and em-
balming of human dead bodies for burial or transportation."' 61
The proposed requirement that the newly defined "funeral direc-
tor" maintain a "funeral establishment" was prompted by two con-
siderations. First, Telophase had been engaging in an activity that
had not been included in the description of Senator Mills' "hypo-
thetical entity," upon which the Attorney General's 1971 opinion was
based. While waiting for the death certificate to be signed by the
attending physicians and the cremation permit to be processed by
the county health department (usually a matter of one or two days,
but sometimes as long as a week), Telophase had been storing the
body at what it termed a "holding station. ' ' 62 The Board considered
58. Cal. S. 616, § 1 (1972).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Act of Sept. 15, 1945, Ch. 830, § 1, 1945 Cal. Stats. 1529 (current version at CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7616 (West 1975)).
62. According to signed affidavits submitted as part of the plaintiff's pleadings in
Department of Consumer Affairs v. Telophase Soc'y, No. 336679 (San Diego Super.
Ct. Dec. 4, 1972), the first holding station used by Telophase was a one-room, concrete
block structure with a garage door, located in a primarily residential area at the rear
of a building used by another business. The room was about 10 feet square and had a
cement floor with a hole in one corner from which plumbing had been removed. When
bodies were delivered to the room, they were placed in either plywood or cardboard
boxes with lids on them and either covered with a disposable sheet or left uncovered.
The room was not refrigerated and bodies held for several days produced a pungent
odor in the room and surrounding area. To alleviate this problem, dry ice was some-
times packed on the bodies to help preserve them, but with little effect.
The use of this holding station caused a controversy between the residents of the
area and Telophase. On several occasions neighbors of the holding station accosted the:
ambulance personnel who were delivering bodies and demanded an explanation of
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this practice to be within the nature of activities for which the legisla-
ture intended regulation for the purpose of protecting the public
health. 63 A second consideration was the desire on the part of the
California Funeral Directors Association to prevent a business such
as Telophase from existing without maintaining conventional funeral
service facilities.64
Throughout its six month life, the bill sponsored by the Board
and the Association was enveloped in controversy. The news media
were quick to point out that the bill had been introduced by a state
senator investigated by a grand jury two years previously for allegedly
accepting a $5,000 campaign contribution from the California Funeral
Directors Association. 5 (The investigation was dropped for lack of
evidence.) The Senator openly admitted that his bill was aimed at the
Telophase Society because, in his opinion, Telophase did not live up
to proper health standards. 66 That claim was quickly countered by a
telegram to the legislature from the Director of Public Health for
San Diego County, who said he "endorsed unqualifiedly the whole
operating procedure of the Telophase Society.
'
"
6 7
Telophase mounted a vigorous lobby against the bill, claiming that
the California funeral industry was trying to protect its business
monopoly by eliminating from the market a lower-priced alternative
to traditional funeral service." This argument was supported editorially
what they were doing. The ambulance personnel were instructed by Telophase officials
not to respond to these inquiries. The controversy grew until the owner of the building
in which the holding station was located received a threat that the building would be
bombed unless the body storage operation was removed. After failing in its attempts
to negotiate with the residents, Telophase abandoned the location and moved its
storage operation to a different building.
This second holding station was a garage-type structure into which an ambulance
or the Telophase station wagon was driven. In a corner of the garage was a used beer
cooler which had been converted into a refrigeration unit for holding the bodies
which had been placed in either plywood or cardboard boxes. There was a leak in the
cooler's refrigeration system, and at times water dripped onto the boxes which were
stacked on the floor below. Some of the boxes became soaked with water and when
lifted, buckled in the middle from the weight of the body inside. The odor of decaying
bodies became distinct both in the cooler and in the room inside the garage.
63. Telephone interview with David T. Buck, Executive Secretary, California Bd.
of Funeral Directors & Embalmers (Aug. 12, 1975).
64. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 31.
65. See, e.g., Los Angeles Times, Aug. 1, 1972, § I, at 3, col. 5.
66. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 31.
67. Id.
68. Letter from Tom Sherrard, attorney for the Telophase Society, to the author
(Aug. 7, 1975). The cost of Telophase service included a $15.00 membership fee and
a payment of $250.00 at the time of death, for a total of $265.00. Telophase claimed
that the cost of an average adult funeral and burial in the San Diego area at that
time was $1,800. The comparison Telophase frequently made between these two figures
was somewhat misleading because the services purchased by each were not comparable.
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by much of the news media, including the Los Angeles Times. 9 For
its part, the California Funeral Directors Association persuaded its
members to back the campaign against Telophase by implying that
if not stopped, the threat it represented to traditional funeral service
might spread statewide from its modest storefront home in San Diego.70
The bill had managed to pass both houses of the legislature and
was back in the Assembly for consideration of minor amendments
when it ran into unexpected opposition. Several representatives began
to speak out against the bill, saying it smacked of monopoly. 71 This
opposition was picked up by vocal California consumers who wrote
outraged letters to their representatives.72 Fearing certain defeat if the
bill were to come to a vote, the bill's proponents invoked an unusual
parliamentary procedure and had it placed in an "inactive file."7 3
After failing to achieve a legislative remedy to the problem of
Telophase's nonlicensure, the State Board and the California Funeral
Directors Association began laying the foundation for an attempted
judicial remedy. As a first step, the Board sought to determine whether
the Attorney General's 1971 opinion would be different for an opera-
tion also engaged in holding bodies pending final disposition.7 4
In his response the Attorney General characterized the question as
not whether the activities of Telophase constituted the practice of
funeral directing (the question he had answered in 1971), but whether
Telophase's holding stations could be construed as "preparation rooms"
as defined in section 7616 of the state's Business and Professions Code.
The Attorney General said one intention of the legislature in enacting
section 7616 was "to prohibit the operation of a preparation room
wherein human dead bodies are prepared and embalmed for burial
or transporation without enforcement, in the interest of public health,
safety and welfare, of the appropriate regulatory safeguards by the
Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers. ' '7 5 Therefore, the Attorney
A more accurate comparison would have been between the Telophase price and what a
funeral director would charge to perform the same services.
69. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 2, 1972, § II, at 6, col. 1.
70. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 31.
71. Id.
72. Ironically, most of the letterwriters mistakenly thought the bill was aimed at
restricting memorial societies, which negotiate fees with licensed funeral directors for
their services. Id. at 32.
73. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 4, 1972, § I, at 3, col. 1.
74. Letter from David T. Buck, Executive Secretary, California Bd. of Funeral
Directors & Embalmers, to Evelle J. Younger, California Attorney General (Sept. 7,
1972).
75. Informal letter opinion of the California Attorney General to David T. Buck,
Executive Secretary, California Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, (Oct. 6, 1972)
(emphasis added).
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General concluded that no entity could maintain such a room without
licensure by the Board. While noting that the term "preparation" was
not defined in the statutes, the Attorney General declared it should be
interpreted broadly. He said, "[I]t would appear that the mere acts
of dressing, wrapping, and/or containerizing human dead bodies
could be construed as acts of preparing for burial or transportation. " 76
This language satisfied the Board that as long as Telophase main-
tained its holding stations it could not operate without a funeral
director's license. Accordingly, the Board, in cooperation with the
Department of Consumer Affairs, sought a preliminary and permanent
injunction 'against Telophase. 77
At the hearing on the motion for an injunction, the Attorney
General, representing the Board, argued that in wrapping a dead body
or placing it in a box for storage in a refrigerated facility, Telophase
was "preparing" the body for its subsequent transportation to the
crematory. He argued further that Telophase's actions constituted
the preparation of dead bodies for subsequent burial of the cremains.
It was the State's position that the legislation pertaining to a "prepara-
tion room" was intended to apply not only to rooms used for embalm-
ing and other activities related to the preparation of a body for view-
ing by either relatives or the public, but also to rooms used for pre-
paring a body in any manner for burial and/or transportation.78
Attorneys for Telophase argued in response that the term "prepara-
tion room" referred to a place in which a body is embalmed and pre-
pared for the public ceremony of a funeral.7 9 Telophase's holding sta-
tions, they claimed, were not rooms in which preparation of bodies took
place in the commonly understood sense of modifying their appearance.
Instead, defense counsel urged, these holding stations were simply
stop-off points in Telophase's direct cremation service, necessitated by
the time it took to secure the certificates and permits required by law
before cremation could be performed. This holding activity, Telo-
phase argued, was not intended by the legislature to be included
within the meaning of "preparation" as used in section 7616.80
The court held that the Legislature had intended that a prepara-
tion room be the "situs of much more sophisticated activity" (such as
embalming or cosmetic preparation) than the mere "handling, en-
76. Id.
77. Complaint, Department of Consumer Affairs v. Telophase Soc'y, No. 336679
(San Diego Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1972).
78. Reporter's Transcript at 27.
79. Department of Consumer Affairs v, Telophase Soc'y, No. 336679, slip. op. at 2
(San Diego Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1972).
80. Reporter's Transcript at 18-20,
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shrouding and boxing" engaged in by Telophase. 18 In support, the
court cited regulations pertaining to preparation rooms which were
promulgated by the State Board, in which the Board referred to pre-
paration rooms alternatively as embalming rooms and required each
such room to be equipped with an embalming table, body drain
tubes, needles, scalpels, hemostats, syringes, cosmetics, wax, and an
embalming machine.8 2 Telophase, the court said, neither needed nor
would use this equipment in its holding operation.8
In denying the Board's motion for an injunction against Telophase,
the court said there was no question that the Legislature could require
a license from all persons who prepare dead bodies for burial or dis-
posal, but that it had not done so.8 4 "Perhaps," concluded the court,
"[the legislature] will find a solution whereby the public interest can
be served by licensing those who prepare dead bodies without requir-
ing them to install unneeded equipment or unnecessary facilities."85
This language may well have prompted the Board and the California
Funeral Directors Association to renew efforts to obtain a legislative
remedy.
A bill was introduced in the 1973 session of the California Legisla-
ture which proposed changes in several provisions in the existing
funeral directors and embalmers law to bring Telophase and other
similar operations within the funeral director licensing requirements.-
Instead of requiring a funeral director's license for one who performed
"each" of three specified activities, as did the existing law,8 the bill
would require a license for someone who engaged in "any" of the
three.m Preparation of dead bodies for transportation became a func-
tion of the funeral director, as did the preparation of dead bodies for
burial or disposal."9 Likewise, a funeral director became one who
maintained an "establishment," as opposed to a "funeral establish-
ment," for the preparation for the transportation or disposition of
dead human bodies.- A "suitable room for the storage of dead human
bodies" was substituted as a requirement in an establishment rather
than a chapel for funeral or religious services.91 Finally, a "preparation
81. Slip op. at 3.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Cal. A. 1828 (1973).
87. See note 53 supra.
88. Cal. A. 1828, § 1 (1973).
89. Id. § 2.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 3.
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room" became a room properly equipped for the preparation, "sanita-
tion," or embalming of dead bodies for burial or transportation. 2
The battle over this second bill was less heated than that waged
over the one introduced the year before, but for the most part the
arguments were the same. There were, however, two points articulated
by the proponents of the second bill, both of which stressed consumer
protection. One concerned the handling of the membership fees which
Telophase collected in return for a reduced charge for removal and
cremation at the time of death. 3 Similar arrangements for the services
of funeral directors, called pre-need trust agreements, were already
strictly regulated under the funeral directors and embalmers law to
ensure no misuse of funds.9 4 Those favoring licensure for Telophase
argued that if it were not licensed, the state would have no effective
means for protecting consumers against misuse of funds. A second
argument was that without licensure of operations such as Telophase,
the State Board did not have the power to investigate and verify the
complaints which had been received concerning some of the Telo-
phase business solicitation techniques 5 and its alleged mistreatment
of dead bodies.9 6 Even if the complaints were verified, without licensure
Telophase would not be subject to the Board's disciplinary powers.
These arguments and a strong lobby by the California Funeral Di-
rectors Association seem to have made the difference. The 1973 bill
92. Id.
93. See note 68 supra.
94. Act of July 15, 1965, ch. 1414, § 1, 1965 Cal. Stats. 3331 (currently codified at
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7735 (1975)).
95. The California Business and Professions Code prohibits a funeral licensee or
his representative from soliciting business after a death or while death is impending.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7694 (West 1975). The Code also makes it a misdemeanor
for a licensee or his representative to pay or offer to pay any sum of money for the
securing of business. Id. § 7716. Numerous funeral directors complained to the Board
that Telophase representatives were selling membership plans to people who desired
to take advantage of the reduced service charge at the time of death. This activity
was directed primarily at convalescent hospitals, retirement villages, and nursing
homes. In at least one instance, Telophase offered to share the membership fee if
the staff of a convalescent hospital would sell Telophase membership plans to its
patients. Letter from Thomas B. Weber, President of the Telophase Society, to the
Ocean View Convalescent Hospital, Encinitas, California (Apr. 2, 1971).
96. In April, 1972, an official of a convalescent hospital in El Cajon, California, filed
a complaint with the State Board regarding a Telophase employee who had come to
the hospital to remove the body of a deceased patient. In addition to complaining about
the employee's casual dress and rude behavior, the official said that after the body had
been removed from the hospital to the Telophase station wagon, the employee asked
for some tissue paper, explaining that his dog had defecated in the vehicle. Letter
from Vanessa R. Nerthling, Director of Nurses, Carroll's Convalescent Hospital, El
Cajon, California, to the California Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers -(April 3,
1972). See also note 62 supra.
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was passed by the Senate and Assembly in 1974, was signed by the
Governor, and became effective in January, 1975.1 At that time Telo-
phase applied for and received its funeral director's license."
In February, 1975, the State Board filed amendments to its ad-
ministrative regulations to implement the provisions of the new law.
Regulations previously addressed to the maintenance of a preparation
room were amended to include a "storage room."99 Funeral establish-
ments engaged solely in the disposition, without embalming, of dead
human bodies were required to have, in lieu of equipment specified
for an embalming room, refrigeration equipment of sufficient size to
accommodate a minimum of two bodies. 100 Also, each licensed "funeral
director" (the new definition included Telophase and similar opera-
tions) who entered into any "pre-need arrangement, contract or plan"
was required to file with the Board annually a written, verified report
pertaining to funds received and held under such contract.'01
B. The Challenge in Florida
In a speech delivered in St. Petersburg, Florida in late 1972, the
President of the State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers
made reference to the Telophase Society's challenge to California's
licensing law. The speaker informed his audience that since the
funeral director licensing law in Florida contained language similar
to that which was the basis of the challenge in California' 0 2 the Board
was contemplating the need for remedial legislation to prevent similar
difficulties with direct cremation services.' 03
In that audience were members of a small St. Petersburg invest-
ment group, some of whom were retired businessmen, who had be-
come interested in what they characterized as a possible "loophole" in
the Florida licensing law.'0 4 After discussing the subject at one of
97. Act of Sept. 27, 1974, ch. 1512, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3324 (codified at CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 7609, 7615, 7616 (1975)).
98. Letter from David T. Buck, Executive Secretary, California Bd. of Funeral Di-
rectors & Embalmers, to the author (July 3; 1975).
99. 16 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 1224(b) (1975).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1269.
102. See FLA. STAT. ch. 470 (1975). The language referred to was § 470.01(3), which
defined "funeral directing" as:
[t]he profession of directing or supervising, funerals for profit, or the profession
of preparing dead human bodies for burial or cremation by means other than
embalming, or the disposition or shipping of dead human bodies, or the pro-
vision or maintenance of a place for the preparation of dead human bodies.
103. Telephone interview with Charles E. Jordan, General Manager and Director,
National Cremation Society (Aug. 20, 1975).
104. Id.
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their meetings, they inquired of the Florida Attorney General whether
a business such as the Telophase Society would be legal under the
Florida statutes. According to a member of the group, they failed to
obtain a written opinion from the Attorney General but instead spoke
with a member of the Attorney General's office by phone and were
told that such a business would be legal in Florida. 1""
Relying on this oral opinion, five members of the group began
laying plans for a direct cremation business in St. Petersburg. Part
of their preparation included a visit to California to meet with the
officials of the Telophase Society and to observe their operation first-
hand. 10 The group was impressed by the California model; they in-
corporated as the Telophase Society of Florida and opened for business
in April, 1973. Telophase Society of Florida eventually became National
Cremation Society.1°7
The operation of National Cremation Society was essentially the
same as that of its counterpart in California, except that National
had its offices, refrigeration facility, and cremation furnace all in one
building. For a membership fee of $24.00 and a charge of $275.00 at
the time of death, 08 National would arrange for a professional livery
service to move the body of the deceased from the place of death to
the National building, where the body would be placed in a card-
board box and held in a refrigeration facility for the forty-eight-hour
waiting period prior to cremation required by Florida law.10 9 During
that time, National would process a death certificate, obtain a crema-
tion request and permit, arrange for newspaper obituaries, and prepare
and submit social security and veteran's benefit forms. The body would
then be cremated at National's building and the cremains disposed of
according to the family's instructions.110
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The name change occurred in October, 1973. Id.
108. The charge for removal and cremation services for nonmembers is $299.00.
The advantage of membership is that the quoted price of $275.00 is guaranteed in
writing regardless of when death occurs, whereas the nonmember price is subject to
change over time.
109. FLA. STAT. § 872.03 (1975).
110. National offers several optional methods for disposing of cremains. The ashes
can be scattered over a special cemetery garden or at sea, sealed in an urn and returned
to the family, or buried in a cemetery. A final option is described in one of National's
advertising brochures:
For those seeking to pay a final tribute to a loved one, the National Cremation
Society provides that opportunity.
The urn used by National Cremation Society is a hollow sphere, made of bio-
degradeable [sic] material, which, when submerged in water, dissolves in a short
time. The material is non-pollutant and will not harm any water life or, in-
directly, human life.
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National Cremation Society was scarcely one week old when its
existence was threatened by several bills introduced in the 1973 Florida
Legislature. House Bill 514 was designed to bring "persons offering
to reduce the body of a deceased person to cremated remains (human
ashes)" within the regulatory powers of the State Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers."' House Bill 516 was designed similarly
to include "persons offering to dispose of the dead without the services
of a funeral director and/or embalmer" among those whom the State
Board regulated. 12 Those operating crematories would be required to
obtain a "certificate of approval" from the State Board" 3 and those
disposing of the dead "without the services of a funeral director and/or
embalmer" would be required to obtain a permit to operate from the
Board.1 4 Both bills provided for the promulgation of rules and regula-
tions governing the respective businesses and gave the Board authority
to inspect both cremation and disposal facilities. 15
Similar legislation was introduced in the Florida Senate. Senate Bill
397 tracked the language of House Bill 516, requiring those disposing
of the dead without the services of a funeral director or embalmer
to obtain permits from the State Board."6 Senate Bill 398 was the
counterpart of House Bill 514; it provided for Board regulation of
those operating crematories. 1
National strenuously opposed the legislation, arguing that the bills
would eliminate direct cremation services in Florida because they
feared prohibitive rules and regulations of the State Board would
force them out of business."" The Board and the Florida Funeral
The cremated remains are placed in this urn and is [sic] permanently sealed at
the crematory. It is then transported, according to your instructions, to an oceanic
site for placement on the water.
Once this urn touches the water surface, it begins to sink to the ocean bed
where it rests until completely dissolved. The ashes fall to the floor, returning the
human element back to whence it came millions of years ago.
(Advertisement in possession of author.)
111. Fla. H.R. 514, § 1 (1973).
112. Fla. H.R. 516, § 1 (1973). House Bills 514 and 516 were introduced on April 3,
1973, along with House Bill 515, which provided that the State Board promulgate
regulations for reciprocity arrangements with foreign funeral director and embalmer
licensing boards. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 48 (1973). (House Bill 515 was eventually passed by
both the House and Senate, and was signed into law by the Governor on May 30, 1973.
Act of May 30, 1973, ch. 73-88, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 141.)
113. Fla. H.R. 514, § 4.
114. Fla. H.R. 516, § 4.
115. Fla. H.R. 514, §§ 3, 4; Fla. H.R. 516, §§ 3, 4.
116. Fla. S. 397 (1973).
117. Fla. S. 398 (1973).
118. Telephone conversation with Charles E. Jordan, General Manager and Director,
National Cremation Society (Aug. 20, 1975).
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Directors Association took the position that all activities involving the
disposition of the dead should be regulated in the public interest and
that the Board was best equipped for such regulation, whether the
method of disposition be a funeral or direct cremation.119 They stressed
that the bill would not require a direct cremation business to obtain
a funeral director's license, but merely a permit to dispose of the dead,
and that rules and regulations separate from those for funeral directors
would be adopted by the Board for the regulation of permittees.12 °
While the bill backed by the Florida Funeral Directors Association
was debated in the legislature,'12 the State Board had been working
with the Florida Attorney General's office on possible legal action
against the direct cremation organization. In April, 1974, the Board
sought an injunction from the Circuit Court of Pinellas County (in
which St. Petersburg is located) against the Telophase Society of
Florida, National Cremation Society, 2 and the directors of the two
corporations, claiming that National was practicing the profession of
funeral directing without a license in violation of chapter 470, Florida
Statutes, the funeral directors and embalmers law. Specifically, the
Board alleged that National was engaged in funeral directing as defined
in section 470.01(3), Florida Statutes, which states:
The term "funeral directing," as used in this chapter, shall be con-
strued to mean the profession of directing or supervising funerals
for profit, or the profession of preparing dead human bodies for
burial or cremation by means other than embalming, or the disposi-
tion or shipping of dead human bodies, or the provision or
maintenance of a place for the preparation of dead human bodies. 23
119. Telephone interview with F. James Wylie, President, Florida Funeral Directors
Ass'n (Aug. 22, 1975). There was logic in this argument with respect to cremation
activities, because Florida's funeral director and embalmer licensing law provides that
cremation facilities "shall be subject to the inspection and regulation provisions of
this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 470.10(9) (1975).
120. Telephone interview with F. James Wylie, Jr., President, Florida Funeral
Directors Ass'n (Aug. 22, 1975). See also Fla. H.R. 516, § 3 (1973).
121. The legislation proposed in both the House and the Senate eventually died
in committee. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1973 Regular Session, Senate
Bill Actions Report at 115; House Bill Actions Report at 118-19.
122. In March, 1973, two corporations had been formed: Telophase Society of
Florida, Inc. and Terminus Society. In October, 1973, Terminus Society was renamed
National Cremation Society, Inc., and the latter corporation assumed all of the option
agreements for cremation that the Telophase Society of Florida, Inc. had entered into.
The directors of National were the same as those of Telophase, and National had
assumed the same physical plant previously used by Telophase. See Brief of Appellant
at 6, Telophase Soc'y v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 334 So. 2d 563 (Fla.
1976).
123. (Emphasis added). This was the language referred to by the President of the
State Board in his speech which the founders of-the National Cremation Society had
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The Board filed a motion for summary judgment. 124 After reviewing
the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits, and after hearing oral argu-
ment, the circuit court ruled that Telophase was indeed practicing
the profession of funeral directing in violation of the statute and
entered a partial summary judgment specifically enjoining the firm
from (a) maintaining a place for the preparation of dead human
bodies, (b) preparing dead bodies for cremation, and (c) disposing
of dead human bodies by cremation. 125
National petitioned the trial court for a writ of supersedeas. The
trial court granted the writ, which stayed the order and allowed
National to continue in business pending final resolution of the
case. 26 National filed a notice of interlocutory appeal in the Second
District Court of Appeal for Florida.12 7
National raised several issues pertaining to section 470.01(3),
Florida Statutes. First, National argued that the circuit court had
erred in holding that the section should be read in the disjunctive
and that the performance of any of the enumerated activities consti-
tutes the practice of funeral directing. National contended that the
word "or" after each clause was intended by the legislature to have a
conjunctive meaning, and should be read as "and," thus requiring the
performance of all enumerated activities to constitute the practice of
funeral directing.12 s The district court of appeal disagreed and affirmed
the circuit court, saying it was obviously the legislature's intent to
regulate each activity mentioned, that the statute was "written with
each category separated by the word 'or'" and that the court would
"assume the statutory language was chosen with regard to its gram-
matical propriety."'
National also maintained on appeal that (a) it did not "prepare".
dead human bodies for cremation, but merely "held" them in a refriger-
ated facility for the forty-eight hours required by law before cremation
could occur; and (b) that it did not provide or maintain a place for
the preparation of dead human bodies, because the place referred to
in the statute was a preparation room used for embalming and
seen as a "loophole" in the Florida licensing law. See also note 53 supra for a com-
parison with the California statutory language.
124. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers v. Telophase Soc'y, Inc., No.
73-5957, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County, May 1, 1974).
125. Id. at 2-3.
126. Id.
127. Telophase Soc'y, Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 308
So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), abf'd 334 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1976).
128. Appellant's Main Brief at 20-26, Telophase Soc'y, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 308 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
129. 308 So. 2d at 608.
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cosmetizing which National said it did not have in its building. The
district court of appeal declined to rule on either of these issues, saying
that a finding by the lower court that National's activities were within
the scope of any one of the activities enumerated in section 470.01(3)
justified issuance of the injunction.130
The district court of appeal also was asked to rule on three state
and federal constitutional issues raised by National."3 First, National
claimed that application of the funeral directing law to its activities
and not to those of others involved with holding dead human bodies,
such as hospital orderlies, morgue personnel, and medical school
students, was an unequal application of the law in violation of article
I, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, and the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 1 2 The court responded, as
the State Board had argued in its brief, that the others are subject to
separate regulatory laws. 133 Moreover, the court held that even if those
persons were not otherwise regulated, selective enforcement of the
Florida statute against National would not constitute an unconstitu-
tional application of the law. 34
National raised a second constitutional issue, which was that the
circuit court's injunction was an unreasonable denial of National's
right to engage in a lawful occupation, there being no overriding
public purpose to be served by the injunction." 5 The district court,
however, again supported the State Board's argument and held that
National's activities were very much amenable to regulation because
of an overriding interest affecting the public health, safety, and wel-
fare." 6 The court further held that the regulatory measures prescribed
in chapter 470, Florida Statutes, were within a proper exercise of the
state's police power. 37
Finally, National argued that the application of the funeral direct-
ing law to its activities was an impairment of the obligation of con-
tracts protected by the Florida and United States Constitutions." 8 To
130. Id.
131. National claimed that because the trial court had not expressly ruled on
the constitutional issues the partial summary judgment had been premature. The
district court of appeal held that under the doctrine of inherency, the trial court
had necessarily rejected National's constitutional arguments by entering the injunction,
and therefore the issues could be raised on appeal. 308 So. 2d at 608-09.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 609.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 608-09.
136. Id. at 609.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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this the district court replied that "all contracts are entered into subject
to the valid exercise of the police power of the state."' 89
After the district court affirmed the injunction against the National
Cremation Society, National immediately petitioned for a rehearing
of the court's decision, but the petition was denied. 140 In April, 1975,
National filed a notice of appeal and a notice of interlocutory appeal
in the Florida Supreme Court and petitioned the court for a writ of
certiorari to consider the district court decision. The supreme court
denied certiorari,' 41 but decided to hear the appeals.142
National raised five issues in the Florida Supreme Court. First,
National contended that Florida's funeral director and embalmer law
was an unlawful exercise of the police power which constituted a viola-
tion of substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.143
National argued that there was no rational basis for requiring, as
the district court of appeal had, that crematories operate with licensed
embalmers. "Why," National queried, "should licensed embalmers be
the only persons who can cremate when embalming is not even re-
quired for cremation? '' 14 4 Since all funeral directors must be licensed
embalmers' 45 and since embalming is not necessary for cremation, it
follows that there is no reasonable basis on which to require that
crematories operate with a licensed funeral director.' 40 Further,
National pointed out that it did not hold any funeral or memorial
services and therefore did not require the services of a funeral di-
rector.'47 The court responded, in a 5-2 opinion, that appellants had
suffered no denial of substantive due process, stating that the public
health and welfare required regulation of funeral directing and em-
balming. "It is clear to us," the court said, "that [National] practices
funeral directing as defined by section 470.01(3) ."148 The court further
found that the legislature had intended that those operating crema-
tories were within the purview of the licensing statute.14 9
139. Id.
140. Id. at 606.
141. Telophase Soc'y, Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 327 So. 2d
229 (Fla. 1976) (mem.).
142. Telophase Soc'y, Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 334 So. 2d
563, 566 (Fla. 1976).
143. Id.
144. Brief of Appellants at 15.
145. FLA. STAT. § 470.08(2)(a) (1975).
146. Brief of Appellants at 15.
147. Id.
148. 334 So. 2d at 566. For statutory language, see text accompanying note 123 supra.
149. Id.
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National next contended that the appellate court had erred in con-
struing section 470.01(3), Florida Statutes, in the disjunctive, arguing
that analysis of the entire statutory section showed the legislature had
intended the word "or" to have a conjunctive meaning.150 National
pointed out that subsection (3) of section 470.01, Florida Statutes,
stated in part the "shipping of human bodies."'151 If the statute were
to be construed in the disjunctive, National argued, then hospital
orderlies, ambulance services, and common carriers practiced funeral
directing each time they "shipped" a body.15 2
The statutory definition of "funeral directing" included the
phrase, "the provision or maintenance of a place for the preparation of
dead human bodies."'' 53 If read in the disjunctive, this phrase would
require the coroner's office, the hospital morgue, and schools of
medicine to be licensed as funeral directors.15 4 If such absurd conclu-
sions would be reached by reading the statute in the disjunctive, Na-
tional contended, the courts should interpret "or" to mean "and.' ' 155
Third, National argued, as it had in the appellate court, that it
did not "prepare" dead human bodies for burial by means other than
embalming but merely "held" human bodies which were to be
cremated. 156 National further argued that because testimony that
National "held" bodies prior to cremation created a material issue of
fact, summary judgment was error. 7 The supreme court affirmed the
appellate court's holding, stating that "[t]he receiving, refrigerating,
storing and cremating [of] dead bodies" was preparation of dead
bodies and was a violation of Chapter 470, Florida Statutes.5 s
Fourth, National contended that the appellate court had erred in
concluding that National disposed of dead human bodies, and had
thus erred in affirming the partial summary judgment in the face of a
genuine issue of material fact. 59 National urged that the term "disposi-
tion" as used in the statute was colored by the addition of the phrase
"or shipping" and should be limited to a transportative sense.160 When
read that way, National contended, there was a genuine issue of
150. Brief of Appellants at 23-24.
151. Id. at 24.
152. Id. at 24-25.
153. FLA. STAT. § 470.01(3) (1975).
154. Brief of Appellants at 26.
155. Id.
156. Brief of Appellants at 28-31. National urged that "preparation" meant some
change or alteration-something active in nature-while "holding" meant no change in
the natural condition of the body-a passive act. id. at 30.
157. Id. at 31. - -
158. 334 So. 2d at 567.
159. Brief of Appellants at 34-37.
160. Id. at 35-36.
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material fact as to whether National disposed of dead human bodies,
and summary judgment could not be granted.16' The supreme court
disagreed with National, and, in one sentence, affirmed the appellate
court's finding that National disposed of dead human bodies.1 62
National's final point was that it did not, as set forth in the licensing
law, "[provide or maintain] a place for the preparation of dead human
bodies. ' '163 National argued that by statutory definition, a preparation
room required embalming equipment 64 and was therefore unrelated
and unnecessary to its business. 65 National also argued that because
it did not prepare dead human bodies, it did not provide a prepara-
tion room. 6 6
The supreme court, relying on its finding that the receiving, re-
frigeration, and cremation of dead bodies constituted "preparation,"
affirmed the appellate court's finding that National maintained a
place for the preparation of dead human bodies. Thus National was
within the purview of the funeral director and embalmer law.167
Justice England, in a dissent with which Chief Justice Overton
concurred, disagreed that National was subject to Florida's regulatory
scheme for funeral directors and embalmers.' 61 The dissent found that
National did not embalm and had no need to do so. 69 Justice England
remarked that National met Board of Health standards, yet provided
a less expensive method alternative to the "typical . . . funeral which
has become part of our culture." 170 The dissent chastised the majority:
"By requiring petitioners to be licensed, and therefore to hire or be
'embalmers,' the majority has placed its approval on a purely anti-
competitive statute by accepting a superficial appeal to the police
power." 17 The dissent accepted National's argument that the statute
could be read logically only in a cumulative sense, rather than in the
disjunctive.172 "[W]hen read in that fashion," the dissent stated, "the
state's legitimate interests become immediately apparent.' ' 173
Finding no apparent reason to involve the police power to require
licensure of National under the Florida statute, the dissent concluded:
161. Id. at 37.
162. 334 So. 2d at 567.
163. Brief of Appellants at 38-44.
164. See FLA. STAT. § 470.01(6)(b) (1975).
165. Brief for Appellants at 38-39.
166. Id. at 39-40.
167. 334 So. 2d at 567.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 334 So. 2d at 567 n.1.
173. Id. at 568.
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"Arbitrary licensing requirements which preserve a trade or profes-
sional monopoly for no discernible public purpose should not be
sanctioned by the courts." 174 After its defeat in the Florida Supreme
Court, National petitioned in federal district court to stay the Florida
Supreme Court's order, pending resolution in the United States Su-
preme Court of the constitutionality of the statute as applied to
National. The federal court denied the stay.175
In 1975, at the same time National filed its appeal in the Florida
Supreme Court, a bill was introduced in the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives which provided that those engaging in the disposition of
human bodies by cremation without the services of either a funeral
director or an embalmer be issued permits by the Board of Business
Regulation (as opposed to licensure by the State Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers). 176 The bill set forth requirements for
permit applicants, specifications of the facility in which cremation
would take place, and required applicants to post bond prior to ob-
taining a permit.177 The bill also authorized the Department of
Business Regulation to conduct necessary inspections of a permit
holder's practice and facilities. 1 7  The regulation of the practice of
cremation set forth in House Bill 1315 was essentially the same as
that in the 1973 legislation which had been backed by the funeral
profession, except that the 1975 bill proposed that the Department of
Business Regulation be the regulatory authority. Thus House Bill
1315 proposed regulation which would protect the public health,
safety, and welfare, but which would not subject those who practiced
only cremation to the authority of those in the funeral directing and
embalming business.
National supported the bill, conceding the necessity for state regu-
lation of its business. National agreed that it should be regulated, as
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Telophase Nat'l Cremation Soc'y, Inc. v. Askew, No. 76-133 (N.D. Fla., Sept. 1,
1976). The case was dismissed in February, 1977. Id. (Feb. 16, 1977).
176. Fla. H.R. 1315, § 3 (1975). H.R. 1315 was read for the first time on the floor
of the Florida House of Representatives on April 16, 1975. The bill was referred to
the Committees on Regulated Industries and Licensing, Finance and Taxation, and
Appropriations. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 186 (1975).
The State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers is a unit within the Division
of Professions of the Florida Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation.
FLA. STAT. §§ 20.30(9)(g), 470.02(1) (1975). The Florida Department of Business Regula-
tion is a separate entity, governed by the Board of Business Regulation. Id. § 20.16(1).
The Department of Business Regulation includes the following divisions: Pari-mutual
Wagering; Hotels and Restaurants; Florida Land Sales and Condominiums; Beverage;
and General Regulation. Id. § 20.16(2).
177. Fla. H.R. 1315, § 4 (1975).
178. Id. § 3.
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was any other business in the state, by the Department of Business
Regulation."' The Florida Funeral Directors Association opposed the
bill, contending that the Department of Business Regulation was not
the proper agency to oversee the practice of cremation. Because the
Department of Business Regulation regulated industries such as hotels
and restaurants, land sales, horse racing, and beverage sales, the Associa-
tion maintained the Department lacked the expertise and resources
to regulate direct cremation services.18 0 The Association feared that
the activities of commission-basis salesmen, such as those employed by
National, would not be subject to adequate control under the proposed
legislation. 81
On May 23, 1975, just two weeks before the end of the legislative
session, the sponsors of the bill and the Committee on Regulated
Industries and Licensing recommended a committee substitute for
House Bill 1315.182 The substitute bill substantially changed three
portions of the original bill. First, it provided that the State Board
of Funeral Directors and Embalmers regulate the business of disposi-
tion of dead human bodies by cremation. 18 3 Second, in addition to
requiring a surety bond from a permit holder, as had the original bill,
the committee substitute required each permittee to hold all member-
ship fees and other payments for future services in a trust fund until
the services secured by the payments were performed. 8 4 Finally, the
committee substitute required that each establishment practicing dis-
position by cremation operate under the "full charge, control and super-
vision of an individually designated licensed funeral director." 185
The Committee Substitute for House Bill 1315 was referred to
the Committee on Finance and Taxation, then withdrawn from that
committee and referred to the Appropriations Committee,'88 where
it remained at the close of the 1975 session. The bill was pre-filed for
179. Telephone interview with Charles E. Jordan, General Manager and Director,
National Cremation Socy (Aug. 20, 1975).
180. Telephone interview with F. James Wylie, Jr., President, Florida Funeral
Directors Ass'n (Aug. 22, 1975).
181. Telephone interview with James C. Cooper, Executive Secretary, Florida Funeral
Directors Ass'n (Aug. 3, 1975).
182. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 683 (1975).
183. Committee Substitute for House Bill 1315, § 3 (1975).
184. Id. § 2(7).
185. Id. § 2(4). According to F. James Wylie, President of the Florida Funeral
Directors Association, who was intimately involved in the legislative events discussed
here, neither the State Board nor the Association knew of the funeral director re-
quirement in advance. Telephone interview (Aug. 22, 1975).
186. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1975 Regular Session, House Bill
Actions Report at 294.
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the 1976 legislative session, but it died in the Committee on Appropria-
tions during that session. 187
In 1976, the Florida Legislature reconsidered Florida's scheme
of professional and occupational regulation. The Legislature passed
the Regulatory Reform Act of 19761" which prospectively abolished
many professional licensing agencies and set forth criteria by which
the legislature should determine whether to reestablish those agencies.
The Legislature stated its intent that no profession or occupation be
subject to state regulation unless regulation was necessary to protect
the public health, safety, or welfare from "significant and discernible
harm or damage."'18 9 The Legislature further mandated that no business
be regulated in a manner "which will unreasonably adversely affect
the competitive market."' 19 0
The Regulatory Reform Act provided for cyclical repeal of the
various statutory chapters creating occupational licensing boards and
commissions. Some thirty-six agencies, including the Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers, are scheduled for termination on July 1,
1978,191 but the Regulatory Reform Act created a joint select commit-
tee to review the activities of those agencies and to make proposals for
their reestablishment and reform.'9 2
In determining whether to reestablish a licensing program, the
Legislature is to consider the following criteria:
(a) Would the absence of regulation significantly harm or en-
danger the public health, safety, or welfare?
(b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the exercise of
the state's police power and the protection of the public health,
safety, or welfare?
(c) Is there another, less restrictive method of regulation avail-
able which could adequately protect the public?
(d) Does the regulation have the effect of directly or in-
directly increasing the costs of any goods or services involved, and,
if so, to what degree?
187. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1976 Regular Session, House Bill
Actions Report at 196-97.
188. Ch. 76-168, 1976 Fla. Laws 279 (codified in part at FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1976
Supp.)).
189. FLA. STAT. § 11.61(2)(a) (1976 Supp.).
190. Id. § 11.61(2)(b).
191. Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 280.
192. FtA. STAT. § 11.61(8) (1976 Supp.). Legislative recommendations as to continua-
tion, modification, or repeal of existing licensing programs are to be made by February
15 in the year of repeal. Id. § 11.61(3). Thus, legislative recommendations regarding
licensure of funeral directing and embalming are to be made no later than February
15, 1978.
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(e) Is the increase in cost more harmful to the public than the
harm which could result from the absence of regulation?
(f) Are all facts of the regulatory process designed solely for
the purpose of, and have as their primary effect, the protection of
the public?9 3
The Florida Legislature, then, has the opportunity to rewrite its
funeral director licensing laws. Hopefully, the Legislature will look
carefully at the problems of the direct cremation business-especially
in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision-and will come forward
with a regulatory scheme for direct cremation services that is fair as
well as reasonably related to the enterprise sought to be regulated.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
To some, the California and Florida experiences with Telophase
and National portend further challenges to existing and appropriate
state regulatory systems for funeral directors and embalmers. To
others, they represent a welcome first step in the successful penetration
of an established occupation's exclusive control over the market for a
necessary societal service. Whether it be characterized as a threat to a
sound regulatory system or as an opportunity for overdue change,
serious attack has been made on the status quo for occupational
licensing laws for funeral directors and embalmers. All indications are
that the challenge has just begun. 9 '
That challenge, as its California and Florida manifestations illus-
trate, is rich in controversy and as such may be destined for similarly
hard-fought resolution in the courts and legislatures of the various
states. But the time, expense, and ill-will caused by battles of the
type witnessed in California and Florida are not necessarily born of
the challenge. Solutions can be fashioned through the joint effort of
public officials and representatives of the adverse interests involved.
A successful effort requires two initial elements: first, that those
who participate be realistic in their expectations and constructive in
their approach; and second, that they share a common perception of
the problem and its potential for resolution. The first, of course, de-
193. Id. § 11.61(4).
194. Since the founding of the Telophase Society of California, 16 direct cremation
services have begun operation in that state, usually in larger population areas where
proportionately more cremations are performed than in smaller cities and rural areas.
Telophase franchise agreements are available in California, with the plan being to offer
them nationwide at a later date. In Florida, the National Cremation Society has offices
in three cities, and its owners are investigating possible markets in at least ten other
states. Telephone interview with Charles E. Jordan, General Manager and Director,
National Cremation Society (Aug. 20, 1975).
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pends on the character of the participants; a basis for the second can
be provided here.
A. The Courts as a Forum for Resolution
Faced with the ongoing violation of a statute it is charged to ad-
minister, a state regulatory board naturally turns to the courts for
recourse after its own efforts to obtain compliance have failed. Like-
wise, those opposing the attempted application of a regulatory statute
to their activities often see the judiciary as the proper forum for
redress. The decision of either side to seek a judicial remedy involves
consideration of three major factors.
The first is the problem of determining legislative intent. As indi-
cated earlier, loosely worded and vague definitions of the terms
"funeral director," "funeral directing," "funeral establishment," and
''preparation room" make them susceptible to challenge by direct
cremation services. Illustrative is the challenge brought in California,
where the court agreed with the Telophase Society's argument that the
definition of "funeral director" in the former California licensing law
could reasonably be construed as not encompassing the activities of a
direct cremation service.19 5 However, while this finding was sufficient
for determining the narrow question of the statute's scope, it con-
tributed little to effecting a solution to the larger problem. Indeed,
the California court indicated its belief that the legislature had intended
to provide for the regulation of all those involved in disposing of dead
human bodies, but had failed to do so in its choice of statutory
language.
The Florida Supreme Court has accepted the argument that the
legislature, in enacting the statute, intended all activities associated with
the disposition of the dead to be performed by licensed funeral di-
rectors or embalmers only. This argument may be accepted in other
states, but it seems tenuous to maintain that legislatures passed existing
funeral director licensing laws with the intent of excluding direct
cremation services. Such operations neither existed nor were con-
templated when the statutes were enacted. The legislative histories
behind funeral director licensing laws reveal that they were encouraged
by funeral director trade associations and adopted by legislatures to
ensure minimum health and sanitation standards in the art of embalm-
ing and in the transportation of dead bodies, and to eliminate the
competition of funeral "merchandisers" who manufactured and sold
195. Department of Consumer Affairs v, Tdlophase Soc'y, No. 336679 (San Diego
Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1972).
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caskets and other funeral goods, but who did not furnish the personal
services of a funeral director." 6
If any legislative intent is to be gleaned from these statutes, it is
that as protector of the public health, the state should regulate who
is permitted to embalm bodies and offer other services connected with
the conduct of a funeral.197 The holding in Department of Consumer
Affairs v. Telophase Society, represents at least one precedent in
support of this interpretation, where a court found that the California
funeral director licensing law (as it was written in 1972) was addressing
the activities associated with the preparation and arrangement of a
funeral, and not the activities of a direct cremation service.
If the terms in a state's funeral director licensing law were defined
unambiguously and a clear expression of legislative intent were to
leave no doubt that only licensed funeral directors would be permitted
to engage in the disposition of the dead human bodies, a second factor
would remain. An established principle underlying the regulation of
occupations is that such regulation is an exercise of the state's police
power and therefore may not be carried out in an unreasonable or
arbitrary manner.""' One standard for evaluating the reasonableness
of an occupational licensing law for funeral directors would be to
examine the statutory requirements for licensure in light of the
functions to be performed by the licensee.
Adopting this functional approach, it becomes evident that many
of the requirements for licensure as a funeral director are unnecessary
to the operation of a business limited to direct cremation services.
Standards of proficiency and suitability for funeral director licensees
that relate to the offering of funeral services are entirely defensible.
Doubts arise, however, when licensing requirements do not relate to
the function to be performed. For example, a person would not re-
quire the extent and content of education prescribed for funeral
directors to properly perform the functions of one engaged in the
direct cremation business. Courses in embalming, funeral business
management, and the techniques of funeral directing would be totally
irrelevant to the performance of that person's occupational tasks.
Neither the apprenticeship nor internship requirements of funeral
director licensing laws are functional for a person in the direct crema-
tion business, nor are the requirements for certain physical facilities
that are obviously addressed to the maintenance of a funeral home
196. HABENSTEIN & LAMERS, supra note 42, at 494-500.
197. Id.
198. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1954); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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equipped for embalming, visitation, and funeral services, and for the
sale of caskets and other funeral supplies.
A similar functional analysis has been applied by courts in several
states when asked to decide a related issue: whether a state can require
applicants for a funeral director's license to have an embalmer's license.
The weight of authority is that considerations of the public health and
welfare do not justify such statutes; the requirements are invalid. 199
The functional analyses used by the courts in these cases provide in-
teresting parallels for the licensing problem here discussed. In Gholson
v. Engle,2°° for example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a funeral
director need not be required to have the knowledge, skill, and training
of an embalmer before he can direct a funeral. In the court's words:
The funeral director is concerned primarily with the amenities
of the funeral service. Proper performance of his other functions,
such as removing and dressing the body, ascertaining the cause of
death, and inspecting the body while it is in the coffin, does not
require a year of college, nine months at an embalming school and
a year's service as an apprentice embalmer. Nor are these qualifica-
tions necessary in order that he may effectively supervise the work
of the embalmer. Specialized training is not required in order to
recognize the conditions that require further work on the part of
the embalmer.20 1
A functional argument has equal force when applied to the question
of whether a person in the direct cremation business should be re-
quired to obtain a funeral director's license. Using the Gholson analysis
as an analog, a court could find the requirement to be an unreasonable,
and thus an unconstitutional, restriction of a person's right to pursue
the occupation of his choice.
This prospect, however, must be tempered by a third factor to be
considered in determining whether to seek a judicial remedy-a factor
which derives from observation of judicial behavior. Despite the pro-
nouncements found in the Gholson case, the judicial inclination is to
uphold most licensing statutes as a permissible exercise of legislative
power. To the extent that state courts follow the lead of the United
199. Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1961); Gholson, v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d
508 (I11. 1956); Kemplinger v. Whyte, 188 N.W. 607 (Wis. 1922); State v. Rice, 80 A.
1026 (Md. 1911); People v. Ringe, 90 N.E. 451 (N.Y. 1910); Wyeth v. Thomas, 86 N.E.
925 (Mass. 1909). Contra, McKinley v. Reilly, 393 P.2d 268 (Ariz. 1964), appeal dis-
missed, 381 U.S. 276 (1965); State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers v. Cooksey, 3
So. 2d 502 (Fla.), modified on other grounds and rehearing denied, 3 So. 2d 502, 508,
adhered to on rehearing, 4 So. 2d 253 (Fla, 1941).
200. 138 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 1956),
201. Id. at 512,
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States Supreme Court," 2 they will be reluctant to substitute their
preferences for those of the people's elected representatives, presuming
instead that a legislature, in adopting the statute, did in fact have
knowledge of conditions supporting its judgment that the legislation
was in the public interest. That presumption is not easily overcome
in an occupational licensing case, and the courts usually hold that
the appropriate forum for the correction of ill-considered legislation
is the legislature itself.203
The examination of these three factors suggests that if a judicial
remedy is sought, the results can be grouped into two possible
categories. One is that a court may find a state's licensing law invalid
either because it is ambiguous as to scope and intent, and therefore
does not apply to the activities of a direct cremation service, or
because it is unreasonably restrictive and therefore void. While such
a result obviously would be welcomed by a direct cremation service
challenging the statute, it merely indicates the limitations of the statute
in question. It leaves unanswered the critical question of how the in-
adequate statute should be corrected.
The second possibility is that a court would uphold the statute
as a proper exercise of legislative power to regulate the disposition
of dead bodies. When that is the result, there remains the equally
salient question of whether a funeral director's license is the proper
means for such regulation. Thus the courts ultimately provide an un-
satisfactory forum for the effective resolution of the question of whether
all those engaged in the disposition of dead human bodies should be
licensed as funeral directors.
B. The Legislature as a Potential Forum for Resolution
In our system of government, the legislative branch is the designated
voice for determining in the first instance how the police power should
be used to protect the public interest. Because of competing private
interests involved in the statutory resolution of most public policy
problems, this determination is often the result of a decisionmaking
process involving negotiation and compromise. Barring acquiescence
on the part of state funeral boards, or voluntary compliance with
funeral director licensing requirements on the part of direct cremation
businesses (both unlikely events), it is evident that any meaningful
202. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
203. See, e.g., Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla. 1976) ("What is harmful or
injurious to the public is for the Legislature to decide and courts should not substitute
their judgment therefor."). But see World Fair Freaks and Attractions, Inc, v. Hodges,
g67 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1972).
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resolution of the problem under discussion will embody both elements
of the legislative decisionmaking process. Thus the legislature, rather
than the judicial system, is the more appropriate forum for effecting
change in state regulation of funeral professionals and those involved
in direct cremation services.
At first blush, this might appear to be an advantage for the organized
funeral industry with its established lobbies and entrenched control
over the regulatory process through positions on state licensing boards.
Under this view, the only task for the funeral profession would be to
see that the status quo in funeral directing licensure is maintained, a
seemingly easy assignment since legislators are not automatically in-
clined to undo what at one time they said must be done to protect
the public interest. But if the experiences in California and Florida
are any indication, some legislators are willing to listen to voices of
change and consider altering the status quo to permit the existence of
direct cremation businesses without requiring them to obtain a funeral
director's license. Though efforts to this end have not yet succeeded in
either state, the near misses are instructive to anyone looking ahead in
anticipation of repeat attempts.
Assuming legislative reception to some form of change in the status
quo for licensing those occupations involved in disposing of the dead,
the contents of legislative proposals to bring about that change are of
ultimate importance. To avoid charges of causing an abusive use of
a state's police power, those responsible for structuring the proposals
must reorient themselves to the fundamental principle behind occu-
pational licensing systems.20 4 The foremost consideration must not be
the welfare of a given occupational interest, but rather the protection
of consumers. Prophylaxis, not aggrandizement, should be the guide-
word in the design of such proposals. In this spirit, the following out-
line of a solution is offered.
C. A Proposed Solution
The first consideration in the design of an occupational licensing
system to provide for the regulation of those involved in disposing of
the dead is whether there is a genuine need for invoking a state's
police power in the interest of protecting the public health, safety,
and welfare. As stated earlier, virtually all state legislatures have
declared a need, in the public interest, for regulating the activities of
funeral directors and embalmers, and these declarations have been up-
held by the courts whenever challenged.20 5 Several sound policy argu-
204. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra,
205. See note 32 supra.
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ments support similar affirmative legislative responses with respect to
direct cremation services.
The primary policy basis for regulating the activities of a direct
cremation business concerns the public health. In any phase of a direct
cremation service's handling of a dead human body, whether it be
transportation, boxing, storage, or cremation, there is a legitimate
governmental interest in insuring that it be done by competent in-
dividuals, in a sanitary manner, and with sanitary facilities to guard
against the spread of normal bacteria produced in a dead body. The
interest is heightened in importance when death results from com-
municable disease. A second argument in favor of regulation for direct
cremation businesses is to ensure against misuse of the membership
fees which most such businesses charge in advance of performing post-
death services. Most states have provided for strict regulation of similar
pre-need funeral arrangements,0 6 and there is no logical basis for not
affording the same protection to consumers of an alternative means
of disposition. Third, the state has an interest in securing the highest
likelihood that those who are involved in a direct cremation business
will conduct themselves in accordance with the laws and administra-
tive regulations designed to promote the competent practice of such
activity. Compliance with the law is certainly fostered by knowledge
of it, which, for operators of a direct cremation business, can be deter-
mined by means of a simple examination, the successful completion of
which is a condition for state authorization to enter into the business.
A fourth consideration has to do with the state's jurisdiction over
those engaged in the direct cremation business to enable an appropri-
ate agency of government to investigate consumer complaints and to
revoke the license of individuals whose abuses of the public interest
are verified.
Having established that there is a legitimate state interest in regu-
lating occupations involved with the disposition of the dead, the
remaining question in designing a solution goes to the form and
substance that that regulation should take. The proposal offered here
presumes acceptance of the functional approach to occupational
licensing mentioned above, and rests on three major recommenda-
tions for change.
(1) The Recognition of a New Occupation.-State legislators, as
well as the American funeral profession must recognize the emergence
of a legitimate peripheral occupation offering to perform part of what
traditionally has been the exclusive responsibility of a funeral direc-
206. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7735 (West Supp. 1977); Nr. REv, STAT. §
71-1342 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 156.125 (West 1974).
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tor. By definition, as well as for considerations of sense and fairness,
the operation of a direct cremation service should be considered
separate and distinct from the practice of a funeral professional.
If professional appellations are to have any meaning, there should
be a discernible relationship between title and function. Funeral di-
rectors, while they may perform related functions, are primarily con-
cerned with the arrangements for, and conducting of, funeral services.
If others offer to provide direct cremation services without funeral or
religious services, it is sensible to recognize that distinction by the
formal title used to refer to them. And if functional differences between
two related occupations will support separate titles, those differences
ought to support separate classifications and requirements for licensing.
Thus, California's practice of referring to and licensing direct crema-
tion services as funeral directors is a misuse of words. In California,
as elsewhere, direct cremation businesses should be recognized as
constituting a new occupational activity related to, yet separate from,
the funeral profession.
(2) The Restructuring of Existing Regulatory Boards.-Having
recognized three separate occupations involved with the disposition of
the dead-funeral directing, embalming, and direct cremation (or two
in those states which combine the occupations of funeral director and
embalmer into one)-and having established a public need for state
regulation of their activities, we turn to consider how that regulation
should be structured. In doing so, we must recognize the economy and
logic of drawing on the resources and capabilities of existing regula-
tory boards for funeral directors and embalmers in each state. With
minor alterations, these boards can be restructured in form and func-
tion to discharge the public interest in the effective regulation of post-
death disposition services.
An existing state funeral board constitutes a regulatory apparatus
functionally equipped to administer state health and business regula-
tions, implement policies on minimum qualifications for practice, ad-
minister competency examinations, issue licenses, and investigate con-
sumer complaints, whether it be for funeral directors, embalmers, or
direct cremation businesses. Given this available expertise and con-
siderable investment in state resources, creating a separate regulatory
agency for direct cremation services or placing them under an agency
not qualified to perform the desired regulatory functions would be
neither functional nor economical. The former especially would contra-
vene one of the primary objectives of occupational licensing reform,
which is to stem the proliferation of separate licensing agencies.207
207. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, ch. 76-168, 1976 Fla. Laws 279
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The critical issue concerning the use of an existing funeral board
structure, however, is not over its functional capabilities, but rather
its membership. Here again, considerations of sense and fairness mili-
tate against a board comprised of funeral professionals or of those
protective of funeral service interests with authority to oversee the
operations of a direct cremation business. To prevent such inequity,
membership on licensing boards should include at least proportionate
representation from those engaged in the direct cremation business.
In states where board membership is appointive, qualified individuals
could be selected from among direct cremation practitioners. Where
membership is elective from a state professional association, direct
cremation practitioners could be expected to organize for at least
this purpose and select from among themselves their representative(s)
on the state board.
This restructuring of state board membership should also allow for
representation from the public at large. Both to protect against the
occurrence and to dispel the appearance of professional collusion, a
nonlicensed, nonpracticing public representative would add a construc-
tive new dimension to the regulatory process. 28 A workable precedent
has already been set for this practice in the states which have public
representatives on their funeral boards. °s
Obviously, if the functional responsibilities of existing licensing
boards are to be expanded, their names should reflect the change. So
too should the statutory titles for the laws applicable to the disposi-
tion of dead human bodies. The imagination of others could surely
produce more satisfactory suggestions on this point, but one example
would be to create a board of funeral and disposition services under a
statutory title of the same name.
(3) The Granting of Separate Licenses.-Once the principle of a
single regulatory structure to oversee the practice of funeral profes-
sionals as well as direct cremation services is accepted, the remaining
issue is the substantive regulation applied to each profession. For the
(codified in part at FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1976 Supp.)). See also text accompanying notes
188-193 supra.
208. Public representation has been called for on corporate as well as state regula-
tory boards. See, e.g., Townsend, A Modest Proposal: The Public Director in CoRPoRArE
PowR IN AMERIucA 257 (R. Nader & M. Greene ed. 1973). In October, 1975, the Wis-
consin Legislature passed a bill to provide for public members on various professional
licensing boards under the state's Department of Regulation and Licensing. Act of Oct.
17, 1975, ch. 86, 1975 Wisc. Laws 469.
209. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 1302 (West 1976) (four licensees, two lay
members); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7601 (West Supp. 1975) (five licensees, three public
members); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3102 (Michie 1975) (five licensees, two lay members);
MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 13, § 29 (West 1973) (four licensees, one public member);
MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.861 (West 1976) (six licensees, one public member).
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purposes of this study, the effectiveness and propriety of existing licens-
ing systems for funeral directors and embalmers is assumed. As men-
tioned previously, however, those same systems are inappropriate for a
direct cremation service under a functional analysis.210 A separate license
is needed for the practice of disposing of dead human bodies by crema-
tion without accompanying funeral rites or ceremonies, with separate
requirements for its issuance geared to protect the public interest
with respect to the particular functions of a direct cremation service.2 1 '
Requirements for a license to dispose of dead human bodies by
cremation could be patterned after those for a funeral director's license
with the retention of most items and with appropriate adjustments
made in others. One desirable change alluded to earlier would be to
eliminate for direct cremation licensees the professional education and
training requirements currently imposed on funeral service licensees.
212
As for requirements that should be promulgated, an applicant for a
direct cremation license should be old enough to enter into legally
binding contracts, and, in the interest of protecting the public health
and welfare, should be required to pass a basic examination on such
matters as the laws pertaining to the transportation and disposition of
dead human bodies, methods for detecting signs of life, and the
handling and reporting of membership fees or pre-need trust funds.
A definition of practice should delineate the authorized functions
of a direct cremation licensee and should specify performance regula-
tions with respect to the transportation, boxing, storage and, where
applicable, cremation of dead human bodies. In the interest of public
210. See text accompanying notes 198-201 supra.
211. The attempt in Florida (see text accompanying notes 176-86 supra) to grant
direct cremation businesses "permits" to practice, as opposed to licenses, may be attractive
as a means of officially distinguishing them from funeral professionals, but such is an
anomalous use of the permit power. Technically, a permit system requires only that
persons register to practice an occupation. Doing business without a required automatic
permit is made an offense, thus encouraging an accurate register of those engaged in the
occupation. Minimum educational qualifications, competency examinations, and criteria
for determining unprofessional conduct are by definition part of a licensing, not a
permit, system.
212. Many occupational licensing statutes currently in force require an applicant
to have at least a high school education. But a United States Supreme Court decision
brings into question the functional justification and legality of such a requirement for
a direct cremation licensee. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring a
high school education as a condition of employment unless it can be shown to be
significantly related to successful job performance. Although Griggs concerned alleged
racially discriminatory hiring practices by an employer, the Court's language would
suggest a position that educational standards restricting occupational access, as well as
employment opportunities, must "measure the person for the job, not the person in
the abstract." There appears to be no job related necessity for a direct cremation service
licensee to have a high school education.
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health, the authorization to store a dead body should be subject to a
time requirement within which cremation must be performed, and
provision should be made that a body must be kept in a refrigerated
facility while being held pending cremation. Other provisions per-
taining to a direct cremation service's physical facilities could include
requirements for the maintenance of a facility with a room equipped
with a tile, cement, or composition floor, necessary drainage and ventila-
tion, and with a refrigeration unit in which to keep a specified minimum
number of dead human bodies from deteriorating before final disposi-
tion. For the most part, the restrictions on business practices enumer-
ated in an existing funeral service licensing statute could, with ap-
propriate modifications, reasonably apply to direct cremation licensees.
Finally, to maintain high levels of rectitude among direct crema-
tion licensees, provision should be made for a decree of suspension or
revocation of license upon a finding that the holder had misrepresented
his skill or scope of practice, had demonstrated his incompetence, or
had engaged in dishonorable conduct relevant to his occupation.2 11
Any such finding should be made after extensive investigation and
suitable proceedings involving the licensee charged with the offense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Changing attitudes toward death and a growing preference among
segments of the American population for other than traditional means
of disposition have produced a direct challenge to the American funeral
establishment. The extent of consumer acceptance of direct cremation
plans makes it clear that some purchasers of disposition services no
longer wish to be limited to options that include what they consider
to be expensive rituals and merchandise. It is equally clear that the
days of exclusive control of the regulatory process for disposition
services by licensed funeral directors and embalmers are numbered.
The challenge has already been raised in two states; it is likely that
more will follow.
The judicial, legislative, and administrative processes all offer
potential avenues of relief for those involved in the challenge to state
licensing systems for funeral directors and embalmers. A functional
approach to the problem (as outlined above) would accommodate the
competing interests of traditional funeral directors and direct crema-
213. The phrase "dishonorable conduct relevant to his occupation" is more meaning-
ful than "good moral character" which is found in most licensing acts. "Bad" character
is relevant only if it bears some relationship to the activity under regulation. If it has
none, moral character should be ignored, whatever its significance might be in other
aspects of the licensee's life.
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tion services. The resultant form of regulation should protect economic
,freedom of choice as well as health and safety. After all, the paramount
interest to be protected is not that of the competing businesses, but
that of the public.
